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Securitization Reversed.  
Does Europeanization Improve Minority/Majority Relations?
Abstract. Through a conceptual framework that combines the English School’s focus on pri-
mary institutions in international society with the Copenhagen School’s theory of securitization 
and desecuritization, this article studies the Europeanization of national minorities. It thus 
signals a categorical departure from the dominant norms transfer approach to problems of 
national minorities in the European Union (EU), an approach that has failed to convincingly 
account for many minority outcomes of European integration. This is particularly true of the 
continual attachment of national minorities to the state’s security agenda. The article takes 
Galbreath and McEvoy’s (2012) hypothesis that the EU has a unique potential to desecuritize 
national minorities, and applies it to one candidate (Macedonia) and one new member state 
(Bulgaria). It assesses flashpoints of minority/majority tensions across several sectors (the ju-
diciary, the police, public administration, political representation, education, and health care). 
The investigation ascertains negative outcomes—desecuritization—but points to the crisis 
of confidence in the primary institution of European integration (supranationality) and the 
ensuing consolidation of nationalism as the dominant institution of pre-EU European society. 
The article concludes that improved minority/majority relations are a possible consequence 
of Europeanization rather than a precondition for it.
Nevena Nancheva is Lecturer in Politics and International Relations at the School of Social 
and Behavioural Sciences, Kingston University, London.
Introduction
The problématique of national minorities1 and European integration has 
traditionally been studied through a top-down approach that focuses on legal 
and policy convergence and formal compliance with EU minority norms and 
1  I use the term ‘national minorities’ here in its broad sense, as per the guidelines to the 
application of the 1992 UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, 
Religious and Linguistic Minorities 47/135, despite the multilayered nuances of difference 
among the various types of national minorities, as well as between national and non-national 
minorities. Cf. http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuideMinoritiesDeclarationen.
pdf. All internet references were accessed on 5 March 2017.
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institutions.2 But the assumption that minority protection is an essential ele-
ment of EU membership (and preparation for membership, as inscribed into 
enlargement conditionality) has only highlighted the discrepancy between 
norm/policy adoption and their outcomes when it comes to national minorities 
in and around the EU. It has diverted attention from the complex relationship 
between shifting notions of sovereignty within the EU and minority/majority 
relations, and has prevented a more in-depth investigation of Europeanization’s 
impact on national minorities’ positions, not necessarily (but especially) in its 
external dimension. Only very recently have challenges against such an ‘EU-
centric’ approach started to mount, directing academic inquiry to the need for 
a thorough rethinking of the framework for studying national minorities and 
Europeanization.3
The purpose of this article is to join academic effort in responding to this need. 
The key argument here is that Europeanization’s (potential) impact on minor-
ity/majority relations should not be overlooked, but that it is best understood 
outside the logic of conditionality. The article proposes shifting the focus of 
inquiry from the content of the specific norms and practices that constitute EU 
minority regulation to the structural opportunities provided by Europeanization 
for transforming the zero-sum logic of minority/majority relations. These struc-
tural opportunities are carried by the supranational norms, rules, institutions, 
narratives, and practices that constitute the context of Europeanization. They 
may not relate directly to minorities, and they may not even be fully adopted 
(EU applicant states are at various stages of adapting to the acquis communautaire, 
and even member states transpose and implement EU rules differently). What 
this article argues is that this context should be considered when studying mi-
nority/majority relations because it profoundly changes their normative basis.
The article builds this claim by combining the methodological tools of two 
conceptual frameworks: the English School’s normative focus on raison de système 
and the notion of primary institutions,4 and the Copenhagen School’s theory 
of securitization and desecuritization.5 The invaluable relevance of the English 
School to this study of Europeanization and minorities is that it prompts us to 
2  Cf. Heather Grabbe, The EU’s Transformative Power. Europeanization through Condi-
tionality in Central and Eastern Europe, Basingstoke et al. 2006; Frank Schimmelfennig / Ulrich 
Sedelmeier, The Europeanization of Central and Eastern Europe, Ithaca et al. 2005; Bernd 
Rechel, ed, Minority Rights in Central and Eastern Europe, London et al. 2009.
3  Cf. Tamara Hoch Jovanovic, Introduction – Rethinking Approaches of Europeanization of 
Minority Politics, JEMIE Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe 13, no. 2 (2014), 
1-14, 1-7, http://www.ecmi.de/fileadmin/downloads/publications/JEMIE/2014/HochJ.pdf.
4  Barry Buzan, An Introduction to the English School of International Relations, Cam-
bridge 2014. 
5  Ole Wæver, Securitization and Desecuritization, in: Ronny Lipschutz, ed, On Security, 
New York 1995, 46-86; Barry Buzan / Ole Wæver / Jaap de Wilde, Security. A New Framework 
for Analysis, Boulder 1998.
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focus on the systemic level and on the institutions that govern its logic. Such 
a focus is often neglected when Europeanization is understood as an impact 
rather than as the source of and the structural conditions for that impact.6 But if 
we refer to one of the most widely recognized definitions of Europeanization—
the emergence of distinct supranational governance structures7—it is clear that 
the focus is, indeed, the systemic level and the changes in the institutions that 
govern it. Thus factoring in the systemic level seems indispensable to studying 
Europeanization. Students of European integration have dedicated an immense 
intellectual effort to outlining and examining an array of supranational govern-
ance structures within their national modalities of adoption and compliance. 
What the English School’s focus on the systemic level can supplement these 
efforts with, is a conceptual and normative framework for understanding the 
broader structural context of the radical change European integration represents 
within international society (in the English School vernacular). The primary 
institutions of international society without Europeanization have been sover-
eignty, nationalism, and human rights.8 The advent of European integration 
dramatically challenged all three of them. Because minority/majority relations 
are tightly linked to interpretations of sovereignty, nationalism, and rights, 
they are inevitably affected. Seen from within the fluid social structure of an 
international society with changing primary institutions, the security analysis 
of minority/majority relations acquires a much more fine-grained conceptual 
and normative framework.9
This article starts from the observation that minority/majority relations have 
inevitably become entangled in the nation-state’s security strategies and security 
agendas. National minorities in Europe have, over time, been linked to ‘hard’ 
national security concerns (through their aspirations for territory, demands for 
political autonomy, and claims for cultural independence), as well as to wider 
‘soft’ security concerns (such as political representation and participation, access 
to economic opportunities, societal cohesion, cultural heritage, and collective 
identity). This broad (sectoral and thematic) security problématique has been 
uniquely captured by the Copenhagen School’s multifaceted conceptualization 
6  I have argued elsewhere that our definition of Europeanization can have a profound effect 
on understanding its implications, and that divergent definitions of Europeanization have in 
particular marked the disciplinary divide between internal and external Europeanization cf. 
Nevena Nancheva / Cvete Koneska, Europeanization without Europe. The Curious Case of 
Bulgarian-Macedonian Relations, European Politics and Society 16, no. 2 (2015), 224-240, DOI: 
10.1080/23745118.2014.996325.
7  Maria Green Cowles / James Caporaso / Thomas Risse, eds, Transforming Europe. Euro-
peanisation and Domestic Change, Ithaca 2001, 13.
8  Barry Buzan, The English School. A Neglected Approach to International Security Studies, 
Security Dialogue 46, no. 2 (2015), 126-143, DOI: 10.1177/0967010614555944. 
9  Buzan, The English School, 138.
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of threats.10 But beyond that, the Copenhagen School is especially relevant to 
the study of security and minorities because of its key methodological contribu-
tion to security analysis: the theory of (de)securitization. By highlighting the 
dynamics of securitization (‘the process by which groups of people construct 
something as a threat’11) and the process of desecuritization (‘the move of an 
issue out of the sphere of security’12), the Copenhagen School theorists have 
opened, for an array of minority-minded security experts, a challenging research 
agenda. Among this agenda’s primary concerns have been interrogating the 
taken-for-granted link between national security and national minorities, and 
the possibility of removing minorities from the nation-state’s security agenda.
Combining the theory on primary institutions in international society (raison 
de système) with (de)securitization theory’s understanding of what constitutes 
national security (raison d’état) seems to provide an invaluable theoretical 
framework for analyzing European integration’s impact on minority/majority 
relations. Applied in 2012 to the study of the EU’s impact on national minorities 
in Central and Eastern Europe,13 (de)securitization theory suggested that Euro-
peanization might offer a unique normative opportunity to detach the issue of 
national minority regulation from the high-security agenda that has governed 
European minority/majority relations. This is because the EU can ‘reconstruct’ 
the narratives of ‘benefit and belonging’ at different social and political levels 
and push for ‘empowerment over protection’ through its system of multilevel 
governance.14 Galbreath and McEvoy explore the potential for a reconstructiv-
ist strategy of desecuritization within the EU but neither examine in detail the 
systemic reasons for this nor investigate specific national narrative contexts. 
This is precisely what the current article aims to address.
Taking up Galbreath and McEvoy’s hypothesis on the EU’s desecuritization 
potential, the article examines two national contexts spanning the external–in-
ternal Europeanization dynamics that have traditionally divided the study of 
the EU’s impact on minority regulation.15 These two contexts are Macedonia (an 
EU candidate state) and Bulgaria (a member state). These two states’ different 
10  Even as it has not exhausted, as is often presumed, the methodological, conceptual, and 
normative complexity of the (analysis of) security provision.
11  Buzan, The English School, 129.
12  Lene Hansen, Reconstructing Desecuritisation. The Normative-Political in the Copenha-
gen School and Directions for How to Apply it, Review of International Studies 38, no. 3 (2012), 
525-546, 527, DOI: 10.1017/S0260210511000581.
13  David Galbreath / Joanne McEvoy, European Organizations and Minority Rights in 
Europe. On Transforming the Securitization Dynamic, Security Dialogue 43, no. 3 (2012), 267-
284, DOI: 10.1177/0967010612444149.
14  Galbreath / McEvoy, European Organizations and Minority Rights in Europe, 283.
15  Ulrich Sedelmeier, Europeanisation in New Members and Candidate States, Living 
Reviews in European Governance 6, no. 1 (2011), 1-52, http://edoc.vifapol.de/opus/volltex-
te/2011/3115/pdf/lreg_2011_1Color.pdf. 
14  Nevena Nancheva
types of engagement with the structural context of Europeanization are meant 
to highlight basic differences and open an agenda for further research. The case 
studies aim to demonstrate how (if at all) Europeanization’s norms, narratives, 
and institutional practices have been engaged recently around flashpoints of 
minority/majority tensions in the two countries. The outcomes in terms of in-
tergroup relations, as the case studies below reveal, point to unaffected or rein-
forced securitization rather than to desecuritization. This is rather discouraging 
in terms of Galbreath and McEvoy’s hypothesis on the EU’s desecuritization 
potential, but it does not immediately invalidate it. 
To better understand the unexpected securitization and absence of desecu-
ritization at the national level, this article looks to the systemic level. Its focus 
is the structural context of Europeanization itself (rather than the contents of 
specific minority norms or their formal modes of transfer). The article engages 
with the ways Europeanization transforms (or fails to transform) narratives 
and practices around minority-relevant norms and concerns. What the analysis 
suggests is weakness in the processes of Europeanization around specific policy 
areas (for example, antiterrorist security measures) and uncertainty in the nor-
mative relevance of Europeanization in the implementation of specific norms 
(for example, norms granting group-specific rights). These have disrupted the 
key EU primary institution (supranationality and its normative detachment 
from nationalism16), thus either subverting the relevance of narratives of supra-
national ‘benefits and belonging’ or harnessing narratives of supranationality 
for the purposes of nationalist political agendas. The weakness and uncertainty 
of Europeanization as a fluid structural context undergoing multiple crises of 
legitimacy, efficiency, and relevance have reinforced the normative power of 
primary institutions characterizing an international society without European 
integration. The employment of nationalist-populist political strategies to justify 
tense majority/minority relations is an indication of this, as are resistance to 
specific supranational initiatives (asylum governance, not studied here) and non-
compliance with existing supranational policies and rules (around the common 
market, the common currency, and treaty rights, not studied here either). The 
ambiguity with which the European project has responded to such challenges 
to its raison d’être has seriously disrupted supranationality as a primary institu-
tion. This needs to be taken into account when assessing how EU membership 
preparation and accession impact on (de)securitizing national minorities. It is, 
in this sense, more useful to think of improving minority/majority relations as 
a possible consequence of Europeanization rather than as a condition for it. 
The rest of the article proceeds in two sections. The first section, ‘(De)Secu-
ritizing Minorities in the EU’, engages with the literature on the relationship 
16  Nevena Nancheva, Between Nationalism and Europeanisation. Narratives of National 
Identity in Bulgaria and Macedonia, Colchester 2015.
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between national minorities and the EU, introduces the conceptual history of 
the securitization perspective in studying minorities, and presents the article’s 
method and argument. The second section, ‘Investigating the Sources of Se-
curitization’, contains the empirical work. It looks for flashpoints of minority/
majority tensions across several sectors—the judiciary, the police and security 
agencies, the civil service, political representation, education, and emergency 
health care—in Macedonia (a candidate state) and Bulgaria (a new member 
state). The analysis seeks both to identify the mechanisms of engaging or avoid-
ing the narratives, norms, and practices of Europeanization and to assess the 
outcomes of this engagement in enabling the desecuritization of minorities.
(De)Securitizing Minorities in the EU
It has been argued that the EU has been concerned with issues of regional 
stability and migration rather than with minority rights as such in its external 
role as a change agent in minority protection.17 That EU institutions only ac-
tively engaged with minority regulation after the instability in the Balkans,18 
and then got caught up in the normative dynamics generated by external norm 
promotion, seems to support this view. The consistent securitization of migra-
tion to Europe, which has taken ever greater political priority during the past 
two decades,19 also lends credibility to the idea that the EU has been concerned 
more with preventing instability-driven migration through institutionalizing 
minority protection than with protecting minorities per se. The numerous link-
ages between policies towards minorities and migrants20 suggest that the by 
now institutionalized securitization of migration in the EU might have affected 
minority policies and discourses more than has been acknowledged.
The Hypothesis: National Minorities and (De)Securitization
Studying national minorities through security analysis, specifically through 
securitization theory, is not new. Over a decade ago now, the pages of Security 
Dialogue started a vivid debate on the inevitability of securitizing national mi-
17  Rechel, ed, Minority rights in Central and Eastern Europe, 86.
18  Gabriel Toggenburg, A Rough Orientation Through a Delicate Relationship. The European 
Union’s Endeavours for (its) Minorities, European Integration Online Papers 4, no. 16 (2000), 1-30, 
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2000-016a.htm. 
19  Jef Huysmans, The Politics of Insecurity. Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU, London 
et al. 2006; Jef Huysmans, The EU and the Securitization of Migration, JCMS Journal of Common 
Market Studies 38, no. 5 (2000), 751-777, DOI: 10.1111/1468-5965.00263.
20  Gwendolyn Sasse, EU Conditionality and Minority Rights. Translating the Copenhagen 
Criterion into Policy, European University Institute Working Paper RSCAS 16, 2005, 1-21, http://
hdl.handle.net/1814/3365.
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norities. The debate touched on the link between security and identity, which 
seemed central to understanding national minority regulation. Referring to the 
Copenhagen School’s conceptualization of societal security as concern with the 
integrity of a presupposed community21 and Jef Huysmans’ conceptualization 
of deconstruction strategies,22 Paul Roe argued in 2004 that minority rights 
are logically impossible to desecuritize.23 Because they are predicated on the 
ethnonational difference of the minority community as a primary identity 
marker, they ‘belong to [societal] security’,24 which is reflected in the threat 
they are seen to pose to the integrity of the titular majority community in the 
nation-state. This is a rather pessimistic view because it suggests that minori-
ties can never be regulated within the ‘established rules of the [political] game’, 
that they perpetually remain an issue ‘above normal politics’.25 Matti Jutila was 
the first to convincingly engage with and challenge this gloomy conclusion.26 
Jutila recognized that national minorities were particularly easy to securitize 
in contemporary Europe because of nationalism’s primary role in constructing 
minority and majority identities and in formulating their demands.27 Juxtapos-
ing societal security to state security, national minorities constantly subvert 
the central claim of nationalism (‘one nation, one state’) and thus challenge 
the very structure of European international society. Albeit very difficult in 
practice, however, Jutila argued, the desecuritization of national minorities 
was still logically possible. Pointing to the multilayered narrativity of collective 
identities and their non-fixed nature, Jutila identified a so-called reconstructiv-
ist strategy of desecuritization,28 which picked up the identity narratives that 
enabled securitization in the first place and reconstructed them in an inclusive, 
non-antagonistic manner. The goal was to renarrate minority identities as part 
of the political community of the state, not as its constitutive Other. Jutila linked 
his conceptualization of minority desecuritization to the policies of multicultur-
alism (pointing to Kymlicka29). But given the many problems identified in the 
21  Ole Wæver / Barry Buzan / Molten Kelstrup / Pierre Lemaitre, eds, Identity, Migration, 
and the New Security Agenda in Europe, London et al. 1993.
22  Jef Huysmans, Migrants as a Security Problem. Dangers of ‘Securitizing’ Societal Issues, 
in: Robert Miles / Dietrich Thränhardt, eds, Migration and European Integration. The Dynamics 
of Inclusion and Exclusion, London 1995, 53-72.
23  Paul Roe, Securitization of Minority Rights. Conditions of Desecuritization, Security 
Dialogue 35, no. 3 (2004), 279-294, DOI: 10.1177/0967010604047527.
24  Roe, Securitization of Minority Rights, 287.
25  Buzan / Wæver / de Wilde, Security, 23.
26  Matti Jutila, Desecuritizing Minority Rights. Against Determinism, Security Dialogue 37, 
no. 2 (2006), 167-185, DOI: 10.1177/0967010606066169.
27  Jutila, Desecuritizing Minority Rights, 177-179.
28  Jutila, Desecuritizing Minority Rights, 180.
29  Will Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular. Nationalism, Multiculturalism, Citizenship, 
Oxford 2001.
  17Securitization Reversed
practice of multiculturalism (e.g. consolidating group differences and group 
borders30), perhaps it is easier to allow for various avenues for desecuritization: 
Lene Hansen speaks of stabilization, replacement, rearticulation, and silencing 
as possible forms that the process might take.31 Rumelili conceptualizes the 
possibility of desecuritization within a distinction between ontological security 
(concerned with the being and identity of the national collectivities) and physical 
security (concerned with the sovereignty and survival of the state).32 He argues 
that breaking the security continuum is possible, thus indirectly breathing opti-
mism into the project of desecuritizing national minorities. In any case, the link 
between renarrating collective identities and the possibility of (de)securitizing 
national minorities has been consistently reaffirmed.
From the pages of Security Dialogue again, David Galbreath and Joanne 
McEvoy brought the debate on the (de)securitization of national minorities 
to Europeanization by exploring how the EU (among other organizations) 
transforms minority outcomes.33 Galbreath and McEvoy argued that of all the 
European organizations that regulate national minorities, the EU was uniquely 
positioned to launch and oversee successful desecuritization. The key to its suc-
cess were its narratives of regional integration and common interests, which 
had the potential to transform the zero-sum logic of minority/majority relations 
within the nation-state into non-zero-sum logic.34 Furthermore, as Galbreath 
and McEvoy argued, the EU can more successfully push, through its multilevel 
governance structure, to empower (rather than protect) national minorities, 
which has been widely identified as the principal omission of existing minority 
regulation in Europe.35 Indeed, students of minority regulation in the EU point 
to the vast potential that primary and secondary EU law changes of the recent 
decade have opened for promoting minority rights and improving minority 
positions.36 Despite Galbreath and McEvoy’s optimistic vision of Europeani-
30  Cf. Christian Joppke, Citizenship and Immigration, Cambridge 2010.
31  Hansen, Reconstructing Desecuritisation, 529.
32  Bahar Rumelili, Identity and Desecuritisation. The Pitfalls of Conflating Ontological 
and Physical Security, Journal of International Relations and Development 18, no.1 (2015), 52-74, 
DOI: 10.1057/jird.2013.22.
33  Galbreath / McEvoy, European Organizations and Minority Rights in Europe.
34  Galbreath / McEvoy, European Organizations and Minority Rights in Europe, 281.
35  Tahwida Ahmed, A Critical Appraisal of EU Governance for the Protection of Minori-
ty Rights, International Journal on Minority and Group Rights 17, no. 2 (2010), 265-285, DOI: 
10.1163/157181110x495890; Tove Malloy, National Minorities between Protection and Em-
powerment. Towards a Theory of Empowerment, Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues 
in Europe 13, no. 2 (2014), 11-29, http://www.ecmi.de/fileadmin/downloads/publications/
JEMIE/2014/Malloy.pdf.
36  Gabriel Toggenburg, The EU’s Evolving Policies vis-à-vis Minorities. A Play in Four 
Parts and an Open End, Bozen 2008, http://www.eurac.edu/en/research/autonomies/min-
rig/Documents/Mirico/Web_del%2030-EU%20and%20minortiy%20protection.pdf; Gabriel 
Toggenburg, Fundamental Rights and the European Union: How Does and How Should 
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zation, however, even the authors’ own findings go little beyond the theoreti-
cal possibility of actual EU achievements in desecuritizing minority/majority 
relations.37 This article aims to advance the debate on the (de)securitization of 
national minorities within the realm of Europeanization in three ways: by com-
bining the Copenhagen School’s conceptual frame of (de)securitization theory 
with the English School’s focus on primary institutions in international society 
and applying it to the study of national minorities in the EU; by investigating 
the mechanisms of engagement or avoidance of Europeanization’s norms, nar-
ratives, and practices in the dynamics of securitization of national minorities; 
and by looking for opportunities for desecuritization.
The Argument. The Role of the EU
Modern attempts to adapt national sovereignty’s normative basis of legiti-
macy to the national diversity of political communities within the state have 
perpetually hit the normative limit of nation-state politics and nationalism as 
a primary institution of the European international structure.38 European states’ 
decades-long disengagement from minority regulation39 illustrates this point, as 
does postcommunist states’ resistance to substantive minority reforms.40 Roe’s 
argument about the pre-given condition of securitization of minority rights, 
however, does not address Europeanization, and this is where this article picks 
it up. Europeanization radically challenges the normative logic of nation-state 
politics by offering, for the first time in modern history, a new, multilevel model 
the EU Agency for Fundamental Rights Relate to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights?, 
EUI Department of Law Research Paper 13, 16 December 2013, 1-14, SSRN, http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2368194; Alessia Vacca, A Comparative Approach between the Council of Europe 
Treaties and the European Union Framework in the Legal Protection of Minority Languag-
es, Revista de Llengua i Dret, no. 53 (2010), 111-136, http://libros-revistas-derecho.vlex.es/vid/
comparative-council-treaties-minority-214768357; Kristin Henrard, Charting the Gradual 
Emergence of a More Robust Level of Minority Protection. Minority Specific Instruments and 
the European Union, Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 22, no. 4 (2004), 559-584, https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1972996.
37  Galbreath / McEvoy, European Organizations and Minority Rights in Europe, 282.
38  Will Kymlicka, Solidarity in Diverse Societies. Beyond Neoliberal Multiculturalism and 
Welfare Chauvinism, Comparative Migration Studies 3, no. 17 (2015), DOI: 10.1186/s40878-015-
0017-4.
39  Mark Mazower, The Strange Triumph of Human Rights, 1933-1950, The Historical Journal 
47, no. 2 (2004), 379-98, DOI: 10.1017/S0018246X04003723.
40  Jennifer Jackson Preece, National Minorities and the European Nation-States System, 
Oxford 1998; Timofey Agarin, A Cat’s Lick. Democratisation and Minority Communities in the 
Post-Soviet Baltic, Amsterdam et al. 2010; Timofey Agarin / Malte Brosig, eds, Trajectories of 
Minority Rights Issues in Europe. The Implementation Trap?, London et al. 2014; Ada-Char-
lotte Regelmann, Minority Integration and State-Building. Post-Communist Transformations, 
London et al. 2017.
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for the exercise of sovereignty. The EU is based on the primary institution of 
supranationality and its subsidiarity principles. The polity that the integration 
project gradually created sources its legitimacy not from a national community 
but from a supranational one, one that comprises a variety of titular nations, 
national minorities, and ethnonational groups. Unlike national sovereignty, 
where power is exercised within political units demarcated on the basis of 
nationhood, supranationality transcends the structurally defining role of na-
tionhood and pools sovereignty. By breaking the link between nationhood and 
political power, Europeanization opens up new possibilities for redefining the 
unequal position of national minorities as minorities in view of the exercise of 
political power by the titular majority. Sovereignty—and, with it, rights—cease 
to be defined exclusively by nationhood and national borders.41 Within the EU, 
the permanent opposition between national minorities and titular majorities in 
restating their claims on state resources (legal rights, social benefits, educational 
opportunities, access to the ‘good life’, and so forth) can begin to lose relevance. 
And this is precisely where European integration’s potential to transform minor-
ity/majority relations—in other words, to desecuritize them—lies.
This is not to say that Europeanization automatically enables equality for 
national minorities or that Europeanization immediately detaches national 
minorities from the nation-state’s security agenda. But it is important to under-
stand that the predicate that makes national minorities’ and titular majorities’ 
legitimacy claims always-already mutually exclusive is no longer necessarily 
valid within the logic of Europeanization. Even before a nation-state accedes 
to the EU, it can transfer sovereignty outside and beyond its national political 
community, and in this way already begin to transform ways of thinking and 
narratives of belonging within it. This needs to be accounted for.42 Europeaniza-
tion has introduced an alternative discursive field, one that challenges national 
sovereignty and grants legitimacy to a different political structure for the ex-
ercise of political power. The very presence of this alternative discursive field 
initiates a radical systemic change that affects the system’s primary institutions, 
institutions that determine the dynamics of minority/majority relations. Beyond 
accession, the functioning of the EU can add so many new levels, checks, and 
opportunities to national politics43 that national minorities and the problems of 
41  Of course, this argument applies to nationals of EU member states and potentially to 
those of applicant states. Third country nationals’ rights have been very clearly defined on 
the basis of nationhood. Cf. Andrew Geddes, The Politics of Migration and Immigration in 
Europe, London et al. 2003.
42  Nancheva, Between Nationalism and Europeanisation. 
43  For example Maria Spirova / Boyka Stefanova, The European Dimension of Minority 
Political Representation. Bulgaria and Romania Compared, East European Politics and Societies 
26, no. 1 (2012), 75-92, DOI: 10.1177/0888325410388831.
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inequality associated with them should no longer be constrained by the limits 
of nation-state sovereignty and its normative logic. 
Most recent academic research on national minorities and Europeanization 
has begun to recognize this.44 Students of European national minorities now 
study not only how legislation and policies are implemented but also the trans-
formative effects of informal rules and practices.45 Europe is seen as ‘a venue for 
leadership, discourse and policy action’,46 where formal and informal domestic 
actors engaged with minority outcomes treat Europe as a resource for domestic 
political action.47 The effects for policy and regulation changes at the EU level of 
such action form the empirical field of the so-called bottom-up approaches that 
have mostly challenged the domination of EU-centric perspectives.48 Although 
popular support for integration is waning and although anti-European agen-
das are rising across the EU, the normative fundament of the Europeanization 
project, together with its efforts in formalizing a minority rights regime, has 
provided an opportunity structure for improving national minority outcomes. 
National minority activists have increasingly taken advantage of that for the 
benefit of the communities they represent.49
Improving national minority outcomes within a governance structure that 
transcends national sovereignty and that sources its legitimacy from shared 
interests rather than from nationhood seems to offer a long-term solution to the 
inequalities suffered by minorities. At the same time, the zero-sum implications 
of compromising national sovereignty by sharing it with minorities begin to lose 
their dramatic quality when seen from the perspective of sovereignty transfers 
to the supranational level. This is what suggests a possibility for desecuritizing 
minority/majority relations within the realm of Europeanization, and is what 
the analysis that follows will attempt to probe in specific empirical contexts of 
minority/majority tensions. The supranational structure introduced by Europe-
anization has in no way supplanted the normative imperatives of nationalism 
44  Hoch Jovanovic, Introduction – Rethinking Approaches of Europeanization of Minority 
Politics.
45  Paolo Graziano / Maarten Vink, eds, Europeanization. New Research Agendas, Bas-
ingstoke 2007.
46  Hoch Jovanovic, Introduction – Rethinking Approaches of Europeanization of Minority 
Politics, 3.
47  Cornelia Woll / Sophie Jacquot, Using Europe. Strategic Action in Multi-level Politics, 
Comparative European Politics 8, no.1 (2010), 110-126, DOI:10.1057/cep.2010.7.
48  For example Kennet Lynggaard, Domestic Change in the Face of European Integration 
and Globalization. Methodological Pitfalls and Pathways, Comparative European Politics 9, 
no. 1 (2011), 18-37, DOI: 10.1057/cep.2009.8; Malloy, National Minorities between Protection 
and Empowerment.
49  Aimee Kanner Arias / Mehmet Gurses, The Complexities of Minority Rights in the EU, In-
ternational Journal of Human Rights 16, no. 2 (2012), 321-336, DOI: 10.1080/13642987.2011.560839.
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in making sense of nation-state politics.50 But it has provided an alternative 
discursive field within which minority demands gain legitimacy and nationalist 
concerns appear less relevant. It is in the interplay between these two fields (the 
raison de système and the raison d’état in the English School) that the dynamics 
of (de)securitization of minority/majority relations will be examined. 
The cases discussed in the next section investigate the mechanisms of this 
interplay by looking for flashpoints of minority/majority tensions across several 
sectors in two national contexts (table 1). The analysis establishes that negative 
outcomes in minority/majority relations are linked to two main mechanisms: 
first, borrowing from the systemic level of EU politics legitimate narrative 
elements that are subsequently employed in advancing nationalist political 
agendas; and, second, mechanically translating the security logic of nation-state 
politics into the language of Europeanization without regard to the specific nor-
mative difference of the EU project, in line with what Karolewski and Suszycki 
describe as EU ‘nationalism light’.51
Investigating the interplay between the normative fields of Europeanization 
and nationalism in governing minority/majority relations in specific national 
contexts seems promising because it provides a much more fine-grained con-
ceptual framework for understanding the changing logic of intergroup relations. 
Applying this conceptual framework reveals a dynamic that continues to place 
national minorities on the state’s security agenda, despite supranationality’s 
primacy within the realm of Europeanization. Minorities are continuously 
inscribed into security, whether as threatening national integrity, sovereignty, 
or culture, or even titular citizens and the national community as a whole. Even 
though European integration has enjoyed many formal successes in uphold-
ing a minority rights regime, minority/majority relations have not necessarily 
improved. That both the EU candidate state and the new member state studied 
here display instances of reinforced securitization rather than desecuritization 
suggests that it makes little sense to think of improving minority/majority rela-
tions through EU conditionality and the transfer of EU-centric minority norms. 
Instead, the conceptual framework employed here enables us to highlight 
the political rhetoric and practices that need to be addressed if desecuritizing 
national minorities is to become possible. It may thus prove useful in harness-
ing Europeanization’s potential to desecuritize minority/majority relations by 
identifying the narrative avenues that have led to their securitization. 
50  Cf. Michael Billig, Banal Nationalism, London 1995. 
51  Ireneusz Paweł Karolewski / Andrzej Marcin Suszycki, eds, The Nation and Nationalism 
in Europe. An Introduction, Edinburgh 2011, 186.
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Investigating the Sources of Securitization
The analysis engages with flashpoints of minority/majority tensions in Mac-
edonia and Bulgaria of the recent five years. It is based on process tracing, and 
discourse and content analysis of official statements. Outcomes are compared 
in terms of publicly aired perceptions of ontological and existential security 
threat by both minority and majority group representatives, selected in the 
analyzed cases on the basis of higher degree of publicity and source authority. 
The investigation conditionally divides the cases into two groups (this is the 
first column in Table 1 above). The first group better illustrates a mechanism of 
securitization whereby narratives and institutional practices of Europeaniza-
tion are borrowed and engaged in the dynamics of intergroup relations and 
employed in advancing ostensibly nationalist agendas. The second group is 
more illustrative of another mechanism of securitization: using the status quo 
of minority/majority relations within the political community of the nation-state 
to justify policies and practices that presumably aim to advance legitimate state 
and minority concerns but that ultimately reinforce inequality and segregation 
within the context of Europeanization.
Table 1. Case studies.
Mechanism of 
securitization
Sector Macedonia Bulgaria Outcome
Europe-
anization as 
a source
Judiciary Good Friday 2012 
murders
Pazardzhik 13 
imams’ case
Muslim minor-
ity communities as 
a security threat
Police and 
Security 
Agencies
Police misconduct 
and excessive use 
of force
National Security 
Agency operations 
in Roma Neigh-
bourhoods
Discrimination
Nationalism 
as a source
Institutional 
representa-
tion
Faux Albanian pub-
lic sector jobs
NCCEII Roma 
reps walk-out and 
occupy
Nonrepresentation; 
focus minority vs 
other minorities
Political  
representa-
tion
VMRO-DPMNE/ 
DUI coalition vs 
opposition
Movement for 
Rights and Free-
doms as a veto 
player
Rift between 
ethnonational elites 
and their publics; 
focus minority vs. 
other minorities
Education Interethnic violence 
in schools
Segregation
Emergency 
Healthcare
Roma violence/ 
medics blockade
Non-access; segre-
gation
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Europeanization as a Source of Securitization
Europeanization has been engaged in the securitization of minority/majority 
relations as a source of legitimate narratives and practices that can be employed 
in advancing nationalist platforms and agendas. In the cases presented below, 
securitizing national minorities within the functioning of the state’s institutional 
structure (the judiciary, police, and civil service) has been aided by Europe-wide 
processes perceived either as an integral element of all-European cooperation 
(e.g. combating radical Islamic terrorism) or as an integral element of Europe-
anization itself (e.g. ensuring institutional representation for national minorities 
in line with EU commitment to promoting minority rights). 
The powerful us-vs-them narratives that have sprung from the global war on 
terror have negatively impacted on intergroup relations in political communi-
ties such as Macedonia and Bulgaria that comprise Muslim groups in minority 
positions (Macedonia and Bulgaria have large Albanian and Turkish minorities 
respectively). Both states have histories of interethnic tensions and conflict, so 
securitizing Islam by linking it to radical acts of political violence across Europe 
(and the globe) has been reflected in that, and appears to have been employed 
for nationalist political contest. 
In Macedonia, an incident that illustrates these tensions and their long-term 
implications is a widely publicized criminal case: the murder, in April 2012, 
of five Macedonian men by ethnic Albanians. A series of minor interethnic 
incidents in the months preceding the murder52 had not had the same repercus-
sions. But the severity of this crime captured antagonistic narratives between 
the Macedonian majority and the Albanian minority, straining minority/major-
ity relations for years after the incident.53 Attempts were made initially not to 
frame the event in ethnoreligious terms. For example, the head of Macedonia’s 
Journalists’ Association, Naser Selmani, called on journalists to exercise utmost 
caution in reporting the incident to avoid ‘inciting inter-ethnic violence’.54 He 
was originally joined by Minister of the Interior Gordana Yankulovksa, who 
called for calm amidst mass protests demanding retribution.55 Immediately 
52  Florian Bieber, Macedonia on the Brink, Open Democracy Net, 28 July 2014, https://www.
opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/florian-bieber/macedonia-on-brink. 
53  Bieber, Macedonia on the Brink; Ljubica Spaksovska, From Feudal Socialism to Feudal 
Democracy – The Trials and Tribulations of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
Open Democracy Net. 23 July 2014, https://www.opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/
ljubica-spaskovska/from-feudal-socialism-to-feudal-democracy-trials-and-tribulati. 
54  Ubijcite pukaa vrz mirot i idninata na Makedonija, Nova Makedonija, 17 April 2012, http://
www.dnevnik.mk/default.asp?ItemID=2C092AD850564345B8256BC8F1A08810.
55  Jankuloska: ne mozhe da se kazhe deka ubistvoto e meguetnichki konflikt, DW, 14 April 
2012, http://www.dw.com/mk/%D1%98%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%BA%D1%83%D0%BB%D0-
%BE%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B0-%D0%BD%D0%B5-%D0%BC%D0%BE%D0%B6%D0%B5-
% D 0 % B 4 % D 0 % B 0 - % D 1 % 8 1 % D 0 % B 5 - % D 0 % B A % D 0 % B 0 % D 0 % B 6 % D 0 % B 5 -
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thereafter, however, the investigation claimed a link between the perpetrators 
and the organized arms trade, the dissemination of radical propaganda, and 
illegal transnational networks. From then onwards, the murders were framed 
as an act of radical Islamic terrorism, even though some Macedonians actively 
protested, on behalf of the Albanian community, against such framing. Yanku-
lovska changed her original stance, claiming the ‘day of the murders has not 
been selected randomly’, while the victims (four young men between the ages 
of 18 and 20, and a man of 45) become consistently referred to as ‘our boys’.56 
It is beyond the interest of this article to investigate the political mechanisms 
that led to this change. What should be highlighted, however, is that the power 
response of the Macedonian authorities in ensuring retributive justice was 
served, tapped into Europe-wide antiterrorism narratives and practices without 
necessarily having the legal case for it. Islamic terrorism ultimately dominated 
reporting on the event and was confirmed in the verdict issued at the end of 
a trial, even though observers point to biases revealed in ‘closed session court 
hearings […] predominantly relying on the unsubstantiated claims of a pro-
tected witness’.57 Ali Ahmeti, the head of the Albanian junior coalition party, 
Democratic Union for Integration (Bashkimi Demokratik për Integrim / Demokratska 
unija za integracija, DUI), even publicly called for an independent retrial. Beyond 
the actual criminal substance of the case, that it could mobilize such long-term 
identity-maintenance practices on both the minority and the majority sides 
indicates a critical intergroup fault line in the political community of the state. 
The protests and counterprotests—organized along ethnonational lines and 
often leading to violence—that accompanied the criminal investigation and 
the court proceedings demonstrate that the terrorism narratives impacted very 
negatively on intergroup relations. That these narratives were sourced from 
European antiterrorism cooperation seems to have reinforced their legitimacy 
and to have further strained minority/majority relations.
%D0%B4%D0%B5%D0%BA%D0%B0-%D1%83%D0%B1%D0%B8%D1%81%D1%82%D0%B
2%D0%BE%D1%82%D0%BE-%D0%B5-%D0%BC%D0%B5%D1%93%D1%83%D0%B5%D1%
82%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%87%D0%BA%D0%B8-%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%BD%D1%84%D
0%BB%D0%B8%D0%BA%D1%82/a-15883400?maca=maz-rss-maz-pol_makedonija_timemk-
4727-xml-mrss.
56  Interpol se vkluchuva vo postragata po osomnichenite za masakrot, Nova Makedonija, 3 
May 2012, http://www.dw.com/mk/%D0%B8%D0%BD%D1%82%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%BF
%D0%BE%D0%BB-%D1%81%D0%B5-%D0%B2%D0%BA%D0%BB%D1%83%D1%87%D1%
83%D0%B2%D0%B0-%D0%B2%D0%BE-%D0%BF%D0%BE%D1%82%D1%80%D0%B0%D0
%B3%D0%B0%D1%82%D0%B0-%D0%BF%D0%BE-%D0%BE%D1%81%D0%BE%D0%BC%
D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%87%D0%B5%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%82%D0%B5-%D0%B7%D0%B0-
%D0%BC%D0%B0%D1%81%D0%B0%D0%BA%D1%80%D0%BE%D1%82/a-15924345.
57  Roland Gjoni / Shirley Cloyes Dioguardi, Crisis Brewing in Macedonia, Open Democracy 
Net, 23 September 2014, https://www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/roland-gjoni-shir-
ley-cloyes-dioguardi/crisis-brewing-in-macedonia.
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A very similar outcome can be observed in Bulgaria, even though it enjoyed 
far more stable interethnic relations post-communism,58 and even though it 
also enjoyed, from 2007 onwards, full EU membership. A large-scale antiter-
rorism case involving the spiritual leadership of the Muslim community in the 
town of Pazardzhik (the case against the thirteen imams) gained popularity 
around the same time. The proceedings, which resonated widely with Muslim 
communities in the country, culminated in 2014 with all defendants being con-
victed for belonging to an illegal (Islamic) organization, and with all but three 
of them being acquitted of disseminating radical Islamic (Salafist) propaganda. 
The prosecution was widely criticized for having relied too heavily on experts 
who lacked competence in Islamic theology and who were unable to provide 
a reliable translation from Arabic. Questions were raised about how evidence 
had been gathered and about the character of the witnesses.59 The prosecution 
justified its case by claiming that ‘a grave threat had been posed against the 
national security and the democratic form of the state’.60 The outcome of the 
trial, however, does little to show how the national security and the democratic 
form of the state had been safeguarded: all but one of the imams were released 
and free to continue preaching because the prosecution could not provide 
a legal reason against it, ultimately all but dropping its main charges. Given 
the problematic criminal substance of the charges, launching such a large-scale 
initiative against local Muslim leaders raises questions. The main justification 
for it had been antiterrorism measures, in line with Europe-wide trends, but 
no acts of Islamic terrorism had occurred in Bulgaria. The narrative borrowed 
from Europeanization legitimated a justice campaign that appeared to lack legal 
merit. The outcome for minority/majority relations was increased tension. Ana-
lysts point to consolidated local support for the tried religious leaders, despite 
their arguably radical rhetoric and backgrounds, as a result of the anti-Islamic 
narratives that the trial invoked. A witness recounts their impression as one of 
‘being tried for being a Muslim’.61 Parallels have been drawn with communist-
era repressions against the ethnic Turks in Bulgaria.62 Chief Secretary of the 
Mufti Office Ahmed Ahmedov is categorical that the trial ‘antagonized people 
58  Nevena Nancheva, What are Norms Good for? Ethnic Minorities on Bulgaria’s Way 
to Europe, Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 23, no. 3 (2007), 371-395, DOI: 
10.1080/13523270701507048.
59  Interview with Antonina Zhelyazkova, Dnevnik, 20 March 2014, http://www.dnevnik.
bg/intervju/2014/03/20/2265053_antonina_jeliazkova_deloto_sreshtu_imamite_-/. 
60  Interview with Nedyalka Popova (prosecutor), Capital, 24 April 2014, http://www.
capital.bg/blogove/pravo/2014/04/24/2287217_deistvie_purvo_na_pricel_v_sudebnata_za-
la_religiiata/.
61  Interview with Antonina Zhelyazkova.
62  Zornitsa Stoilova, Edin za vsichki. Vsichki za Ahmed, Capital, 21 March 2014, http://
www.capital.bg/politika_i_ikonomika/bulgaria/2014/03/21/2265851_edin_za_vsichki_vsich-
ki_za_ahmed/.
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and […] worked against the interests of the state’; ‘Muslim people are think-
ing: “Are they starting again? […] When will I be accused for my beliefs?’’’.63 
The ease with which the judiciary could be involved in reinforcing intergroup 
tensions is a clear indicator of securitization: drawing an issue from the agenda 
of ‘normality’ to the level of high security and ‘emergency’. 
The police are another central actor in this dynamic. Security and law en-
forcement agencies have strained intergroup relations in postconflict Balkan 
societies. Police in Macedonia have often been accused of ethnonationally 
biased treatment of Macedonian citizens. Command and communication in 
the police happen in the Macedonian language, despite the legal amendments 
of 2011, which have been widely interpreted by Albanians as granting equal 
status to the Albanian language within the structures of the defence and interior 
ministries, among others.64 As a result, Macedonian police have often been ac-
cused of using excessive force or engaging in misconduct against members of 
the Albanian minority.65 Engaging the police in intergroup strife indicates high 
levels of securitization of minority/majority relations under the imperatives of 
ensuring stability and peace. These have also been the priority of EU policies in 
Macedonia, as evidenced by the EU’s involvement in managing the aftermath 
of the 2001 interethnic conflict.66 Stability and peace as security imperatives 
have thus become closely intertwined with narratives of Europeanization. But 
while Europeanization’s impact (or lack of it) here can be analyzed only within 
a broader contextualization of Macedonia’s EU trajectory, it appears that security 
practices have had ambivalent effects on minority/majority tensions around the 
work of the Macedonian police.
The work of the Bulgarian State Agency for National Security (Dărzhavna 
agentsiya ‘Natsionalna sigurnost’, DANS), whose operations in 2010 were at the 
heart of the imams’ trial, has also been criticized for bias against minorities. 
In late November 2014, DANS launched a large-scale operation in the Mus-
lim (mostly Roma) neighbourhoods of four towns, with the official purpose 
63  Interview with Ahmed Ahmedov, Kakvo patriotichno ima v tova da izpravyash horata 
edni sreshtu drugi, Capital, 28 March 2014, http://www.capital.bg/politika_i_ikonomika/bul-
garia/2014/03/28/2270065_kakvo_patriotichno_ima_v_tova_da_izpraviash_horata/.
64  Biljana Popovska, Theoretical Concepts to Conflict Resolution and Peace Building in 
Divided Societies, Contemporary Macedonian Defence 13, no. 24 (2013), 123-136, http://www.
morm.gov.mk/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/SMO24-ang_.pdf.
65  Such claims have related to the Macedonian police’s handling of the Kalé incident over 
the building of a church-museum near Skopje in February 2011; to their handling of the double 
murder in Gostivar of two Albanians by a policeman in February 2012; and to their handling 
of ethnonational tensions around the murder of a Macedonian teen by an Albanian thief in 
May 2014, to list but a few examples.
66  Cvete Koneska, After Ethnic Conflict. Policy-Making in Post-Conflict Bosnia and Her-
zegovina and Macedonia, London et al. 2014.
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of uncovering a reportedly ‘dormant cell of Islamic State’.67 The operation 
happened at dawn, covering densely populated residential neighbourhoods, 
and graphic materials recovered from the operation were immediately shared 
on social media, attracting protests on behalf of the Muslim community. The 
head of the DANS, Vladimir Pisanchev, later described the operation as ‘gen-
eral prevention’.68 That it was launched on the basis of ‘no specific operative 
information’ did lead to his being summoned to a closed-doors hearing in 
parliament, where his resignation was demanded, but he remained in post. 
Experts and analysts are almost unanimous in their opinion that the only visible 
result from DANS’s operation was to instil fear and seriously strain relations 
with Bulgaria’s Roma Muslims.69 This happened against the backdrop of the 
ultranationalist factions in the Bulgarian parliament (mostly around the Ataka 
movement) spreading anti-Islamic narratives. But in view of similar processes 
in most EU member states, no substantial correctives have been established 
against employing antiterrorism narratives to justify arguable security practices 
in dealing with Muslim minorities. Europeanization has thus appeared unable 
to improve minority outcomes.
Another element borrowed from Europeanization, and employed in securitiz-
ing national minorities, is the focus on minority representation in state institu-
tions and decision-making. Minority representation is an element of the minority 
rights regime upheld by the EU. It is therefore both a minority-specific European 
norm and also part of a supranational regime that represents one dimension 
of Europeanization (minority protection). How states interpret and implement 
this norm should thus reveal more about how Europeanization impacts minor-
ity/majority relations. In Macedonia, the Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) 
(also closely intertwined with the dynamics of Europeanization70) addresses the 
problem of Albanian under-representation in the public administration in its 
Section 4. The OFA’s target of equitability was seen to be 25% (approximately 
in line with the proportion of the Albanian minority population). Applying 
the criterion of equitable representation only formally, however, produced 
a contentious outcome: as Vice Prime Minister Musa Xhaferi openly admitted, 
67 Vladimir Pisanchev, Tova ne e kletka na isliamska durjava, Dnevnik, 26 November 
2014, http://www.dnevnik.bg/citat_na_deniia/2014/11/26/2427241_citat_na_denia_tova_ne_e_ 
kletka_na_isliamska_durjava/. 
68  Ivelina Karabashlieva-Dundakova, 1001 vuprosa kum DANS, Dnevnik, 3 December 2014, 
http://www.dnevnik.bg/analizi/2014/12/03/2430255_1001_vuprosa_kum_dans/.
69  Cf. Interview with Antonina Zhelyazkova; Ivelina Karabashlieva-Dundakova, 1001 
vuprosa kum DANS. 
70  Maria Koinova, Challenging Assumptions of the Enlargement Literature. The Impact 
of the EU on Human and Minority Rights in Macedonia, Europe-Asia Studies 65, no. 5 (2011), 
807-832, DOI: 10.1080/09668136.2011.576023; Nancheva / Koneska, Europeanization Without 
Europe, 11. 
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an unspecified number of Albanians employed in the public administration 
received wages but had no real job.71 It has been pointed out that nominally 
increasing the number of Albanians in the civil service (from 3-4% in 2001 to 
18-20% in 2011) has been turned into ‘a mechanism for the employment of un-
qualified party activists and soldiers’72 (Mersel Biljati, former Albanian legisla-
tor). The so-called framework payouts contributed to the perception that OFA 
public sector representation arrangements had failed.73 That no other minorities 
benefited from the arrangements suggests the instrumental implementation 
of narratives and practices of inclusion ‘borrowed’ from Europeanization to 
advance a power-sharing agenda that served the participating ethnonational 
elites but not the minority those elites represented. The formal implementation 
of a minority norm, brokered by the EU as it was, and characteristic of the EU 
minority rights regime, does not seem to have substantively improved minor-
ity/majority relations.
In Bulgaria, instrumentally engaging with the imperative of minority inclusion 
in public decision-making and institutional representation produced a similar 
outcome for the Roma minorities. Recognizing the endemic quality of Roma seg-
regation and discrimination, Bulgaria set up a governmental body, the National 
Council for Cooperation on Ethnic and Integration Issues (Natsionalen săvet za 
sătrudnichestvo po ethnicheskite i integratsionnite văprosi, NCCEII) and hosted in 
Sofia the launch of a large-scale European strategy (Decade for Roma Inclusion, 
2005-2015) together with eleven other EU member and candidate states. The 
efforts in preparing a national strategy for integrating the Roma (2012-2020) 
within the framework of Bulgaria’s EU membership indicate that combating 
Roma segregation was seen as normatively imperative. But beyond the laud-
able rhetoric, NCCEII struggled to include the Roma. Thirteen leading Roma 
political parties and activist organizations walked out of the NCCEII in 2013 
after their requests for administrative restructuring and regulatory reforms were 
repeatedly ignored. Over the following months the head of the NCCEII (and 
vice prime minister), Zinaida Zlatanova, refused all contact with them. After she 
failed to show up at a national monitoring conference for the implementation 
of the National Strategy for Roma Inclusion in December 2013, the thirty-five 
participating Roma activists also left the event and headed for the Ministerial 
Council building, where they demanded to speak to Zlatanova. The incident 
developed in absurd tones, with the dissenting Roma activists ‘occupying’ the 
71  Cf. Siniša-Jakov Marušić, Macedonia to Hire More Ethnic Albanian Civil Servants, 
BalkanInsight, 18 September 2014, http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/macedonia-to-em-
ploy-more-minority-civil-servants/1431/46. 
72  Cf. Interview with Kim Mehmeti, Faktor, 13 October 2014, http://faktor.mk/2014/10/13/
intervju-kim-mehmeti-makedonija-oddamna-e-trgnata-nizvodno-dali-kje-ispliva-na-bregot/.
73  Cf. Bieber, Macedonia on the Brink.
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building for several hours until they negotiated a meeting through intermediar-
ies, as Zlatanova was reportedly reluctant to meet them in person and as a group. 
Even so, the meeting did little to ease disagreements, as Zlatanova insisted that 
she ‘would only work with the Roma within the format of the National Council’ 
and, unless they rejoined it, she ‘would find other Roma activists willing to work 
with her’.74 While occurring within a nominally representative body, the power 
struggle taken up by the vice prime minister contributed to Bulgaria’s failure 
to co-opt Roma leaders and break the cycle of the Roma community’s chronic 
lack of representation. It points to a dynamic within which the EU narrative is 
borrowed without regard to its normative contents and aims. Rather, the op-
portunity for minority representation and participation offered in the body of 
the Council was used to reinforce the majority’s power position in dictating the 
terms of minority/majority relations.75
This subsection has highlighted minority-relevant problem areas, policies, 
and practices that appear not to have benefited from Europeanization, in that 
minority/majority relations have not improved. We observe either new avenues 
for securitization (the Islamic terrorism narratives and antiterrorism policies) or 
reinforced securitization (the bias of the judiciary and law enforcement agencies 
against minorities) or a lack of desecuritization despite minority-specific norms 
pertaining to Europeanization having been adopted (minority representation 
arrangements and participation bodies). The observations indicate that minor-
ity/majority relations have not improved within the context of Europeanization 
and that elements of Europeanization itself seem to have been employed in 
securitizing national minorities. 
Nationalism as a Source of Securitization
Another mechanism of securitization revealed by the investigation captures 
the reverse dynamic: translating the logic of nation-state politics to the EU level. 
The cases below, touching on problems of political representation, education, 
and health care, demonstrate that whenever the engagement of national mi-
norities reflected the primacy of national security and nation-state integrity, or 
treated minorities as a dangerous collectivity within the state, Europeaniza-
tion not only did not improve minority/majority relations; it often seemed to 
reinforce existing tensions. 
74  Purva romska okupacia na Ministerski suvet, Obektiv 216, 18 December 2013, http://
www.bghelsinki.org/bg/publikacii/obektiv/obektiv/2013-12/prva-romska-okupaciya-na-min-
isterskiya-svet/. 
75  The Roma minority’s situation is further complicated by the specific long-term context of 
segregation and discrimination that has determined Roma position in European states, but also 
from the fact that the Roma are not a national minority in the strict sense of the word (they do 
not have a titular state). I am grateful to the SD anonymous reviewer for highlighting this point.
30  Nevena Nancheva
The Macedonian OFA’s key focus on maintaining and preserving the integrity 
of the state has, as analysts have observed, to a large extent impeded substantial 
implementation of minority rights per se.76 It has, instead, simply cemented 
a power-sharing deal between ethnic party elites77 perceived as ‘sultan-parties’.78 
Besides the Albanians, no other minorities have benefited from the reforms.79 
What is more, a rift has opened up between the ruling elites and their publics,80 
suggesting that minority outcomes on the ground are not seen as adequately 
pursued at the level of state politics. This is visible, for example, in the coali-
tion government’s resistance to allowing other political actors to represent the 
Albanian minority: DUI’s Ali Ahmeti’s position is that ‘a third Albanian party 
would fracture the Albanian vote’.81 The large-scale scandal involving long-
standing wiretapping practices by the government only show the extents to 
which the coalition government had entrenched its positions in dealing with the 
opposition ‘at any cost’.82 But even before the scandal, the OFA’s power-sharing 
arrangement had been assessed as deficient (‘a dead man awaiting his burial’83). 
The OFA’s failure to establish a sustainable route to minority representation 
reflects its central concern with the stability and integrity of the sovereign state. 
The gradual loss of hopes for progress on the EU membership agenda has only 
reinforced the lack of an alternative model for the exercise of sovereign power. 
The role of Bulgaria’s Turkish minority party, the Movement for Rights and 
Freedoms (Dvizhenie za prava i svobodi, DPS), as a perpetual veto player in the 
forming of governments has also often been criticized for attempting to ap-
propriate the minority vote for the benefit of its own elite.84 In both Macedonia 
and Bulgaria the minority/majority power-sharing deals established in different 
periods of the postcommunist transitions have ultimately benefited only one 
focus minority which had been critical in ensuring the stability and integrity of 
76  Koinova, Challenging Assumptions of the Enlargement Literature.
77  Spaksovska, From Feudal Socialism to Feudal Democracy; Bieber, Macedonia on the 
Brink.
78  Interview with Teuta Arifi, Fokus, 25 February 2011, republished on http://fokus.mk/
gruevski-ne-mozhe-da-napravi-golemi-neshta-za-narodot-pa-zatoa-gradi-golemi-spome-
nitsi-za-sebe/.
79  Dalibor Stajic, Minority Protection in the Republic of Macedonia under the Weight of 
EU Conditionality. Pre-Accession Monitoring as a Mechanism of Furthering Compliance?, 
EU Policy Briefs 2, Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung, CRPM Center for Research and Policy Making, 
October 2012, 1-19, http://www.crpm.org.mk/?p=7288. 
80  Gjoni / Diguardi, Crisis Brewing in Macedonia; Interview with Kim Mehmeti.
81  Ali Ahmeti so vetuvanje deka ke go zatvori prashanjeto za dvojazitsnost, Alsat M, 25 
November 2014, http://www.alsat-m.tv/mk/294815/.
82  Prvo redovno zasedanie: Vo kakva sostojba e demokratijata vo Makedonija?, Preku-
granichen komitet, 23 December 2014, http://zasedan.ie.mk/?p=103. 
83  Interview with Kim Mehmeti.
84  Dimitar Bechev, Bulgaria in Limbo, OpenDemocracy, 12 October 2014, https://www.
opendemocracy.net/can-europe-make-it/dimitar-bechev/bulgaria-in-limbo. 
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the state. The growing alienation between the ethnonational elites, whose posi-
tions the deals consolidated, and their publics indicates, among other things, 
that they have had questionable impact on advancing positive outcomes for 
minority groups and for intergroup relations in general. The imperative of en-
suring stability and integrity as primary raison d’état within the nation-state has 
thus interfered with the systemic logic of supranationality. The minority elite 
engagement that has followed this logic has not ‘trickled down’ to members of 
the minority—or to members of other minorities—and has not removed minor-
ity issues from the state’s security agenda.
Implementing another European minority rights norm—minorities’ right to 
be educated in their mother tongue—within the constraints of nationalist poli-
tics, albeit within the context of Europeanization, has also had very ambivalent 
results in terms of minority/majority relations. OFA provisions on education 
(under Section 6) consolidated Albanian ‘functional autonomy’ in the education 
sector and de facto reinforced intergroup segregation. Albanian elites vehe-
mently resisted, including by popular mobilization, any attempt to break the 
segregation—for example, by making the study of the Macedonian language 
in primary schools compulsory—because they perceived such attempts as en-
croaching on their rights.85 Meanwhile, the concern with ethnic intolerance in 
schools and interethnic youth violence has become ever more pressing.86 Data 
from the Macedonian Helsinki Committee and the Nansen Dialogue Centre 
suggest that the majority of the 175 reported hate crimes in 2014 were interethnic 
and involved underage children, often happening in and around schools. Since 
2012 the Macedonian Ministry of Education has implemented a strategy for re-
ducing school violence through, inter alia, integrated education. The education 
minister, Abdylaqim Ademi, insists that teachers need to be trained to teach in 
interethnic schools, but the goal of integrated education has so far been impos-
sible to reconcile with the Albanian minority’s right to educational autonomy. 
Interethnic violence in schools has been controlled with the help of the police 
or through maintaining physical segregation, but no long-term policy solution 
has so far been found. A possible intergroup cooperation strategy could have 
been provided through the EU membership preparation route, but accession 
negotiations have repeatedly been postponed. 
EU membership, however, is not an automatic solution to segregation and the 
intergroup tensions linked to it, as a recent case from Bulgaria indicates. After 
an attack on medical personnel attending an emergency call in a Roma neigh-
bourhood in late November 2014, the minister of health services, Petar Moskov, 
85  Koneska, After Ethnic Conflict, 146-152.
86  Lidija Hristova / Aneta Cekik, Discrimination in Macedonia’s Multi-Ethnic Society. Per-
ceptions of Inequality among the Student Population, New Balkan Politics, Special Issue 2013, 54-
69, http://www.newbalkanpolitics.org.mk/uploads/attachments/3._hristova_and_cekik(1).pdf.
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stated that no emergency medical attention would be provided to Roma areas 
until the safety of the medical personnel in the ambulances had been ensured 
by police cars.87 The minister claimed that out of 227 recorded cases of violence 
against medics, 174 had happened in Roma areas. The Evroroma Party leader, 
Tsvetelin Kanchev, objected that the roots of the problem were to be sought not 
in Roma violence but in the purportedly tardy responses of medical teams when 
called to Roma neighbourhoods.88 The ensuing public debate on the subject has 
been rich in antiminority narratives and accusations of racism. The Bulgarian 
Union of Medical Doctors stood behind the health minister, even as the minister 
of justice condemned his words as hate speech. Eventually, Moskov partially 
retracted his statement, but insisted that the segregation of Roma areas was so 
severe that they were beyond state reach and thus ‘extremely dangerous’. This 
explicit securitization rhetoric, an attempt to justify a political faux pas, reveals 
the consensual quality of the logic of securitizing the Roma. Analysts point out 
that Europeanization has effectively changed little of that, both in Bulgaria and 
across Europe.89
The examples in this subsection have highlighted contexts in which the 
normative logic of nation-state politics is translated to Europeanization, thus 
(re)producing minority securitization. The emphasis on national integrity and 
stability when renegotiating intergroup relations (rather than on rights, pro-
tection, substantive inclusion, and so forth) has contributed to retaining the 
high-security marker attached to minorities’ access to political power, without 
necessarily enhancing effective participation (the alienation of ethnonational 
minority elites from their publics). The same is true of enforcing minority 
group rights (mother-tongue education) without regard to maintaining access 
to a shared public space, which is essential in a common political community. 
The purposeful securitization of minority spaces as zones beyond the respon-
sibility of the state is another example of employing the nation-state logic of 
legitimation, disregarding the context of Europeanization, and specifically its 
concern with minority integration.
87  Petar Moskov, Ekipi na speshna pomosht nyama da hodyat v romskite mahali, 
dokato ne se garantira sigurnostta im, Dnevnik, 7 December 2014, http://www.dnevnik.bg/
zdrave/2014/12/07/2433695_ekipi_na_speshna_pomosht_niama_da_hodiat_v_romskite/.
88  Tvetelin Kanchev, Ot dnes Speshna pomosht vliza v romski mahali samo pri osigurena 
bezopasnost, Dnevnik, 8 December 2014, http://www.dnevnik.bg/zdrave/2014/12/08/2434026_
ot_dnes_speshna_pomosht_vliza_v_romski_mahali_samo_pri/.
89  Melanie Ram, Europeanized Hypocrisy. Roma Inclusion and Exclusion in Central and 
Eastern Europe, Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe 13, no. 2 (2014), 15-44, 
http://www.ecmi.de/fileadmin/downloads/publications/JEMIE/2014/Ram.pdf.
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Conclusion
This article has sought to contribute to the debate on the impact of Europe-
anization on national minority outcomes and minority/majority relations in 
Europe by combining the Copenhagen School’s (de)securitization theory with 
the English School’s notion of primary institutions in international society into 
a hybrid conceptual framework. The article has applied this framework to mi-
nority/majority relations in one EU candidate state (Macedonia) and one new 
member state (Bulgaria). As specific and idiosyncratic as these two national 
contexts are, they are representative of states involved in (different stages of) 
Europeanization. Europeanization is understood here as a changing structural 
context, not as the adoption of ‘good’ (minority-specific, or else) norms and 
practices. Europeanization implies all that, but it is, before all, the imagining of 
an international society governed by the primary institution of supranationality. 
The shift from national sovereignty to supranationality in the systemic logic of 
Europeanization is what inspired our interest in Europeanization’s impact, since 
minority/majority relations are governed by the rules of sovereignty.
(De)securitization theory has suggested that Europeanization can remove 
national minorities from the state’s security agenda and thus improve minority/
majority relations. Unexpectedly, our analysis has demonstrated that security 
concerns continue to be tightly intertwined with the handling of national mi-
norities at all political and social levels, escalating to high-security politics the 
functioning of ‘everyday’ state structures such as the judiciary, the police, the 
civil service, political representation, health care, and public education. Rather 
than improving intergroup relations, Europeanization’s narratives, norms, and 
practices have been engaged in the very dynamics of securitization we expected 
to see reversed. Minority-relevant narrative elements from the systemic level of 
EU politics and even specific minority rights norms can be borrowed to justify 
ostensibly antiminority practices or formal minority norm implementation 
without regard to substantive improvement of minority outcomes. Moreover, 
when interpreted within the logic of nationalist politics, and in view of the 
nation-state’s security agenda, Europeanization’s concern with minority rights 
consolidates the inequality of minority positions and perpetuates intergroup ten-
sions. The analysis points to negative outcomes for minority/majority relations: 
continued discrimination, segregation, a lack of representation in institutions, 
a lack of access to services, benefits for one critical minority at the expense of 
all others, alienation between ethnonational elites and their publics, and the 
singling out of Muslim national minorities as a security threat.
This confirms our claim that Europeanization’s impact on intergroup rela-
tions is to be sought not in the exact content of the minority regulation but 
in how Europeanization is interpreted and in the normative structure within 
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which Europeanization is implemented.90 But it also disappoints us because we 
expected to see improved minority/majority relations and decreasing securitiza-
tion. Although national minorities occupy a categorically different structural 
position within the realm of Europeanization, they remain securitized. Keeping 
a steady eye on the systemic level, as our framework dictates, suggests an expla-
nation in the modalities of Europeanization as a structural change rather than 
those of minority/majority relations as specific cases. The principal advantage 
of this approach is that it opens a viable research agenda for comparison and 
investigation. Europeanization introduces a structural change for all involved 
states. The modalities of involvement imply differences. Applicant states are 
not yet bound by the rules, regulations, and policies of the acquis but do sub-
scribe to the narratives and practices of Europeanization. States implement the 
acquis and interpret Europeanization differently. It is these differences—the 
modalities of involvement—that determine the impact of Europeanization’s 
primary institution. The normative power of supranationality (shared govern-
ance, community, and interests) and its relevance to national politics have been 
affected by the crises of confidence the EU has battled in the last decade. The 
logic of national sovereignty and nationalism (as the primary institutions of 
pre-EU Europe) have been quick to reoccupy the normative vacuum created. 
In the ensuing interplay between the discursive fields of supranationality and 
national sovereignty described above, national minorities more often than not 
(are forced to) assume their traditional position within the nation-state, a posi-
tion of inequality and high security. This outcome does not, however, invalidate 
Europeanization’s claim for normative difference of national minorities; it only 
ascertains its present political weakness and normative uncertainty. However, 
should the European project emerge from its crisis of confidence, minority/
majority relations could still be desecuritized. Such a desecuritization is but 
one possible consequence of Europeanization.
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